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Introduction
Privatization of state-owned and collec-
tive enterprises in China, which began with 
small and medium enterprises, has spread to 
relatively large enterprises since the latter half 
of the 1990s. Outright privatization of large 
state-owned enterprises, however, has been 
an exception rather than the norm. Privatiza-
tion of large enterprises is rather apt to follow 
the two-stage formula: (1) reorganization of 
an enterprise into a joint stock company and 
its listing on a stock exchange; and then (2) 
gradual reduction of the state's equity share 
in that company. As a result of corporate re-
form since the latter half of the 1990s, quite a 
few large state-owned enterprises have already 
cleared the fi rst stage of becoming joint stock 
companies and getting listed on the stock ex-
changes. The second stage of the reduction 
of the state's equity share in these enterpris-
es fi nally got around to the implementation 
phase in 2001 as an offi cially sanctioned pol-
icy. But this stage has encountered a variety 
of constraints, including stock price declines 
and the lack of competent entities capable of 
corporate governance, making it likely that it 
will be considerable time before the second 
stage makes signifi cant headway. 
This chapter focuses on privatization 
through stock markets as a way toward privati-
zation of large enterprises as the fi nal stage of 
privatization of state-owned enterprises.
5.1 From Exchange Listing to Sale of 
State-owned Equity Shares
5.1.1 Stock Markets as Venues for 
Corporate Reform
As reviewed in Chapter 2, privatization 
of small and medium enterprises has been 
carried out through the conversion to em-
ployee-owned enterprises or the buyout by a 
small number of parties, such as managers of 
enterprises being privatized and outside en-
terprises. As the procurement of funds nec-
essary for acquisitions become more readi-
ly available through bank loans or informal 
fi nancings, enterprises with relatively large 
size are now being privatized through similar 
methods.
However, as the size of enterprises grows 
larger, it becomes more diffi cult to privatize 
them by turning them employee-owned or 
through the buyout by a small number of par-
ties such as enterprise managers and outside 
enterprises. Thus, the stock markets, which 
realize the ownership of capital by a large 
number of investors by breaking up an enter-
prise's stock into negotiable shares, is expect-
ed to play the most important role in priva-
tization of large enterprises holding massive 
assets.
Listings of Stocks of State-Owned Enterprises
China's stock markets entered the stage 
of full-blown development in the latter half 
of the 1990s (see Table 1). When the stock 
price indices reached their apexes in May 
2001, the total market capitalization exceed-
ed 5 trillion RMB (approximately US $600 
billion),temporarily overtaking the Hong 
Kong stock market as the second largest mar-
ket in Asia after the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
Shares are divided into negotiable 
shares and nonnegotiable shares. Negotiable 
shares, which are allowed to be freely trad-
ed on the stock exchanges, are again divid-
ed into three types: RMB-quoted A-shares, 
B-shares denominated in foreign curren-
cies, and H-shares listed on overseas stock ex-
changes. On the other hand, state shares held 
by the government (guojia gu) and legal per-
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son shares held by enterprises (faren gu) are 
not allowed to be distributed freely. The ma-
jority of legal person shares are assumed to be 
state-owned legal person shares held by state-
owned enterprises. State shares and state-
owned legal person shares are collectively 
called state-owned shares (guoyou gu).
The original purpose of banning the 
circulation of state shares and legal per-
son shares was to maintain the ratio of state-
owned shares in listed enterprises. The ratio 
of state shares declined from the early part of 
the 1990s toward the late 1990s, but the ratio 
of legal person shares actually increased, lim-
iting the decline in the ratio of nonnegotia-
ble shares small. Of the legal person shares, 
the ratio of state-owned legal person shares is 
not precisely known but roughly estimated at 
about 60%. It is likely that the combined ratio 
of state shares and state-owned legal person 
shares has only shown a minimal drop despite 
the rapid development of the stock markets. 
Signifi cance and Limitations of Separation-Type 
Listings
When a state-owned enterprise is reor-
ganized into a joint stock company for its list-
ing on the stock market, it is usually the case 
that performing assets are taken over by a 
newly created joint stock company while the 
parent enterprise continues to exist as a type 
of a holding company. This method may be 
tentatively labeled as "separation-type listing".
A good example of separation-type list-
ing is Baoshan Steel (Baosteel), which went 
public in 2000 as the biggest domestic mar-
ket listing of state-owned enterprises at that 
time. Baoshan Steel has restructured most 
of its production facilities as assets of the list-
ed enterprise (see Figure 1), and the parent 
group corporation (jituan gongsi), through 
the delegation by the State Council, exercises 
its authority as the owner of state shares that 
account for 85% of shares of the listed enter-
prises. Baoshan Steel Company Ltd., the list-
ed enterprise, is only about 20% of the group 
corporation in size in terms of total assets. 
But since most other subsidiaries of the group 
corporation are either in the red or have only 
small profi ts, the group corporation's profi t 
level (pretax profi t in 2000) stood at only 3.5 
billion RMB, about 900 million RMB less than 
the listed enterprise.
In China, where most of large state-
owned enterprises are burdened with exces-
sive facilities or redundant labor, it is true 
that the separation-type listing is a realistic 
approach. From the standpoint of reform of 
the corporate management system, howev-
er, there are obvious limitations on the sepa-
Table 1  Composition of Stocks Issued by Companies Listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen
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ration-type listing. The Baoshan Steel exam-
ple may be a case of extremity with the very 
high ratio of 85% for state shares. Yet, in gen-
eral, the ratio of state shares or state-owned 
shares in listed state-owned enterprises reach-
es as high as several dozen percent. As a con-
sequence, parent enterprises remain in a po-
sition to exercise effective control over the 
management of listed enterprises as the larg-
est shareholders dwarfi ng other sharehold-
ers. It also means that the administrative au-
thorities that oversee parent enterprises can 
also intervene in management of listed en-
terprises through parent enterprises that re-
main as the top shareholders. As the scale of 
the stock market grew, the frequency of inci-
dents also increased where parent enterpris-
es, and the administrative authorities that pull 
the strings from behind, obtained improper 
benefi ts from listed enterprises by taking ad-
vantage of the privileged position as the top 
shareholders(See Chapter 4).
Moves toward Liquidation of State-owned Shares
In seeking the development of the stock 
markets, the policymaking authorities previ-
ously tended to give priority only to the stock 
markets' aspect as the channel of fund-raising 
for large state-owned enterprises. Reform of 
the management system of state-owned enter-
prises in association with the stock market list-
ing was emphasized as the key principle, but 
Figure 1  Stock Listing of State-owned Enterprise: Case of Baoshan Steel 
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the slogan lacked substance, and this led to 
the frequent occurrences of abuses by parent 
enterprises.
The stock market, that are void of sound 
corporate governance cannot grow out of the 
"pit of gambling." Market instability would un-
dermine investor confi dence, and could even-
tually destroy the fund-raising function of the 
stock markets. In this context, the awareness 
of the need to establish sound corporate gov-
ernance at listed enterprises grew stronger in 
China from the late 1900s to 2000, and the 
idea of the phased liquidation of state-owned 
shares emerged in this process.
5.1.2 Privatization through Sale of 
State-owned Shares
State-owned shares (state shares and 
state-owned legal person shares) are not cur-
rently allowed to be traded freely on the stock 
markets, but can be sold in negotiated trans-
actions with the approval of authorities. Since 
it was not easy for private enterprises to ob-
tain offi cial approval for their exchange list-
ings, some private enterprises opted for the 
indirect listing through the method called 
"shell buying," which is the buyout of already 
listed state-owned enterprises with deteriorat-
ing business performance. Since the substan-
tial easing of political constraints on business 
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Figure 2  Buyout of Changzheng Machine Tool by Top Group
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activities of private-sector enterprises after 
the 14th Congress of the CPC, there was the 
gradual increase in the buyout of listed state-
owned enterprises by private enterprises for 
the purpose of shell buying.
Increase in "Shell Buying"
A typical example of shell buying is the 
buyout of Changzheng Machine Tool Com-
pany Ltd. by private software fi rm Top Soft-
ware (see Figure 2). Changzheng Machine 
Tool was a state-owned enterprise under the 
aegis of Zigong City, Sichuan Province, which 
went public on the stock market in 1995. But 
its business performance deteriorated rap-
idly after the exchange listing, with after-tax 
profi t in 1997 plunging to one million RMB, 
less than one-tenth of the pre-listing level. In 
1998, major private software fi rm Top Soft-
ware, also based in Sichuan Province, pur-
chased all the state shares held by Zigong City 
for the 48.4% equity stake in Changzheng Ma-
chine Tool, changed the corporate name into 
Sichuan Top Software Company Ltd., and 
then switched its main business to software 
development.
The sharp increase in the acquisition 
of listed enterprises since 1997 is clearly no-
ticeable. But it is diffi cult to have a true fi gure 
of shell buying cases because there is no sta-
tistics available on the buyout of listed state-
owned enterprises by private-sector enterpris-
es. An estimate based on the transfers of state 
shares put at about 40 the number of cases 
that can be assumed to be the buyout of listed 
state-owned enterprises by private enterprises 
in the period between January 1999 and mid-
September 20001. This estimate does not in-
clude the purchases of state-owned legal per-
son shares. The sale of legal person shares has 
been made very frequently in recent years. 
Therefore, if the purchases of state-owned le-
gal person shares are included, it is highly 
likely that the number of the acquisitions of 
listed state-owned enterprises by private en-
terprises increased to exceed the above-men-
tioned number substantially.
Moves toward the buyout of listed state-
owned enterprises by private enterprises are 
important as a step toward market mecha-
nism-based privatization of large enterprises. 
However, despite the rapid development of 
private enterprises, they have limitations on 
their funding abilities and a majority of acqui-
sition targets are middle-standing and smaller 
enterprises with deteriorating business perfor-
Table 2  Trends towards Divestiture of State-owned Shares
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mance. In order to push ahead with privati-
zation of large enterprises by making use of 
the stock markets' function of concentration 
of scattered capital, it is necessary to systemat-
ically carry out the sale of state-owned shares 
to general investors on the stock markets. The 
sale of state-owned shares on the markets be-
gan to take a concrete shape in 2000 (see Ta-
ble 2).
5.1.3 Launch of a Policy for Sale of 
State-owned Shares
As discussed in previous chapters, the 
15th Congress of the CPC in 1997 marked the 
fi rst tilt of the party leadership's policy toward 
privatization of state-owned enterprises. But 
the party leadership still held on to a cautious 
stance on institutional reform of the owner-
ship of large enterprises, which would touch 
the very basis of the socialist economic system. 
What prodded the party leadership to decide 
in favor of the promotion of the sale of state-
owned shares on the market was the need to 
respond to the looming risk of a fi scal crisis.
Risk of Pension Liabilities
Since 1997, the central government has 
been developing the social security system, 
centering on pensions, as a part of reform of 
state-owned enterprises. The core of the pen-
sion system reform was the shift from the pay-
as-you-go system to the funded system. In the 
transitional period, the need arise for ensur-
ing benefi ts to retirees who have not suffi -
ciently funded their own pension plans un-
der the pre-reform pay-as-you-go system. In 
the Northeastern region, where the ratio of 
retirees to workers in service is high and the 
economy was languishing, regional pension 
funds already began to fall short of resourc-
es around 1997. The central government be-
gan to cover the shortfalls in 1998, with these 
compensation expenditures swelling rapid-
ly from a little over 2 billion RMB in 1998 to 
10 billion RMB in 1999 and further to 30 bil-
lion RMB in 2000.2 In 2001, the central gov-
ernment's expenditure to cover the pension 
funding shortfalls reached 34.2 billion RMB, 
or about 17% of the year's total pension bene-
fi ts amounting to about 205.0 billion RMB.3
   The shortage of pension funds in the tran-
sition from the pay-as-you-go fi nancing to 
the funded system is generally called the gov-
ernment's "hidden liabilities." Estimates of 
the size of the "hidden liabilities" vary due 
to different assumptions, but they are gen-
erally believed to amount to 2 trillion to 3 
trillion RMB.4 At present, pension-related ex-
penditures account for a relatively small share 
of the central government's expenditure, but 
the potential risk of a fi scal crisis cannot be 
neglected considering that China is expected 
to experience a very rapid aging of the popu-
lation even by global standards over the com-
ing 20 years.5 The rapid expansion of issuance 
of defi cit-covering government bonds since 
China introduced a policy for domestic de-
mand expansion through public investment 
further created concerns over a possible fi scal 
crisis in the future.
At the fourth Plenum of the 15th Central 
Committee of the CPC in September 1999, 
the decision was taken to reaffi rm the poli-
cy for "strategic adjustment of the state econ-
omy" adopted at the 15th Party Congress in 
1997, and specifi ed areas over which the state 
should control more clearly than before (Col-
umn 1). At the same time, on listed enter-
prises, the decision said the "proportion of 
ordinary negotiable shares should be raised 
appropriately, and several state-controlled list-
ed enterprises that are highly rated and have 
high growth potential should be chosen for 
the sale of state-owned shares in these enter-
prises in an appropriate manner provided 
that state control over them is maintained," 
offi cially announcing the policy for the sale of 
state-owned shares for the fi rst time. Follow-
ing this decision, the State Council kicked off 
the policy for the sale of state-owned shares 
for the immediate purpose of raising funds to 
cover the shortfall in social security funds.
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Launch of Trial Sale of State-Owned Shares
In November 1999, right after the decision at 
the fourth Plenum of the 15th Central Com-
mittee, the China Securities Regulatory Com-
mission designated a total of 10 listed state-
owned enterprises with the state ownership of 
60 to 70% for the fi rst trial of the sale of state-
owned shares on the market. Of the 10 enter-
prises, the partial sale of state-owned shares in 
China Jialing Motor Company Ltd. and Gui-
zhou Tires Company Ltd. were implemented 
at the end of 1999.
Since the state-owned shares in these 
two enterprises were priced close to market 
prices despite their lackluster business perfor-
mance, the sale was not well received by the 
market, leaving about 20% of the planned 
sale amounts unsold.6 Share prices of these 
two enterprises surged briefl y at the time of 
the decision on the share sale, but plunged af-
ter the actual sale on the market, deepening 
market participants' wariness about the poli-
cy for the sale of state-owned shares. Because 
of this development, the sale of state-owned 
shares in the remaining eight enterprises, ini-
tially planned for 2000, was virtually suspend-
ed, and a review was launched within the 
government and the China Securities Regula-
tory Commission on the method of the sale of 
state-owned shares.
Despite the disappointing result of 
the fi rst trial, the government policy to push 
ahead with the sale of state-owned shares was 
strengthened, rather than weakened. In De-
cember 1999, senior offi cials of the Ministry 
of Finance unveiled for the fi rst time the goal 
of reducing the ratio of state ownership (the 
ratio of broadly defi ned state-owned shares, 
including legal person shares) of listed enter-
prises in non-priority industry sectors from 
62% to 51% in the fi rst stage of the policy for 
the sale of state-owned shares.7 Then, in Sep-
tember 2000, it was reported the goal in the 
second stage would seek to lower the ratio of 
state-owned equity shares to 30%.8
Following the review of the method of 
the sale that took a year and a half, the State 
Council on in June 2001 fi nally issued a no-
tice on the "provisional rules for management 
of fund-raising for social security through the 
sale of state-owned shares." The rules stipulat-
ed that when state-owned enterprises reorga-
nized into joint stock companies publicly of-
fer new shares or increase capital, they are 
required to sell at market prices state-owned 
shares equivalent to 10% of the amount of 
funds to be raised through the offering of 
new shares or capital increase. Further, under 
the new rules, the proceeds from the sale of 
state-owned shares are paid into the National 
Social Security Fund, established in 2000 for 
the purpose of covering the shortfalls of so-
cial security funds by the central government. 
Setback in the Policy for the Public Sale of State-
owned Shares
The Chinese government reportedly in-
tended to raise some 20 billion RMB by the 
sale of state-owned shares under the "provi-
sional rules," releasing state-owned shares in 
Column 1
Description of “industries and areas where the state economy should keep control” in Resolution of 
Fourth Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Central Committee of the CPC (Excerpt)
?Industries and area where the state economy should keep control in principle are as follows: 
industries that concern national security, natural monopoly industries, industries that supply 
important public goods, and important enterprises affiliated with core industries and high-
technology. In other industries and areas…development of the non-public economies including 
individual or private enterprises should be encouraged and directed on the premise of maintaining 
the principle of the dominant status of the public economies.
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about 10 enterprises, including Sinopec Co., 
the largest-ever initial public offering in Chi-
na. But the market was far more cautious than 
the government anticipated toward the sales 
of state-owned shares. The stock markets, 
which hovered around record levels by May, 
started steep declines about the time of the 
announcement of the provisional rules (Fig-
ure 3). The markets' decline widened to over 
30% by October, forcing the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission to declare the sus-
pension of the sale of state-owned shares un-
der the provisional rules on October 22. It ap-
pears the amount of funds raised by the sale 
of state-owned shares before the suspension 
was only about 10% of the planned amount. 
The substantial shrinkage of nearly one tril-
lion RMB in the total market capitaliza-
tion whipped up investor panic over the gov-
ernment's policy for the sale of state-owned 
shares.
In promoting the sale of state-owned 
shares, the government paid its greatest at-
tention to a potential impact on the stock 
market. The government limited the sale of 
state-owned shares to just 10% of the amount 
planned to be raised by new share issuance or 
capital increase with the intention of mitigat-
ing the impact on the stock market by making 
the sale gradual. Despite these careful con-
siderations on the part of the government, 
the stock market responded with a dramatic 
fall to force the suspension of the sale policy. 
All this came as a great shock to the govern-
ment. The government and the China Securi-
ties Regulatory Commission subsequently ad-
opted an unprecedented measure to publicly 
solicit ideas and schemes for the sale of state-
owned shares via the Internet, and consid-
ered proposals submitted.
The decision the government made af-
ter a little over six months of consideration 
was far more drastic than expected. In June 
2002, the government declared that except 
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Figure 3  Trends of Shanghai Stock Exchange Index (May 14, 2001 and afterwards)
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for initial public offerings on overseas mar-
kets, provisions of the "provisional rules" for 
the release of state-owned shares on the stock 
markets will be suspended permanently and 
that new provisions will not be formulated.
The attempt at the sale of state-owned 
on the stock market ended in the rejection 
by the stock markets themseives. The govern-
ment's decision to permanently suspend the 
provisions of the "provisional rules" for the 
sale of state-owned shares rules out the re-
lease of state-owned shares on the domes-
tic market, but does not at all mean the with-
drawal of a policy to reduce the ratio of state-
owned shares. The government's decision says 
that state-owned shares will still be released 
in stages as necessary to raise cash by selling 
them to so-called "strategic investors." As such 
"strategic investors," the government appar-
ently has in mind private-sector enterprises 
and foreign-affi liated enterprises as well as in-
stitutional investors at home and abroad.
5.2 Constraining Factors for Privati-
zation of Listed Enterprises
5.2.1 Macro Aspects-Household Sav-
ings for Buying State-Owned 
Shares
The party policy shift in the latter half 
of the 1990s effectively relaxed political con-
straints substantially on privatization of list-
ed and other large enterprises. As indicated 
by the successive failures in 1999 and 2001 of 
the policy for the public sale of state-owned 
shares, the most immediate diffi culty in priva-
tization of listed enterprises in China is the 
highly technical problem of how to facilitate 
the sale of state-owned shares by avoiding giv-
ing a big impact on the stock market that has 
now grown to be one of the largest in China. 
Constraining factors for privatization of list-
ed enterprises are examined below from both 
the macro and micro aspects. 
Scale of Sale of State-Owned Shares and the Stock 
Market's Fund-Raising Capacity
Of the total number of shares currently 
outstanding, the broadly defi ned state-owned 
shares (state shares and state-owned legal per-
son shares) are estimated to account for 60% 
(see Table 1). On the basis of the total mar-
ket capitalization as of the end of 2001, the 
broadly defi ned state-owned shares are wroth 
approximately 2.6 trillion RMB. Based on the 
policy goals of reducing the state-owned equi-
ty share to 51% in the fi rst stage and to 30% 
in the second state, the capitalization of state-
owned shares to be sold would amount to 
around 430 billion RMB in the fi rst stage and 
to 860 billion RMB in the second stage, for 
a combined sum of around 1.3 trillion RMB. 
On the other hand, the scale of funds that 
can be raised through the stock market is ex-
perientially assumed to be about 15% of the 
total value of negotiable shares (about 250 bil-
lion RMB in 2001).9 Given annual fund-rais-
ing needs of 100 billion to 200 billion RMB 
in recent years and assuming that these reg-
ular fund requirements are satisfi ed on the 
market fi rst, the stock market has room to ab-
sorb only several dozen billion RMB worth of 
state-owned shares in a year. This means that 
it would take over 10 years to complete the 
second stage of the sale of state-owned shares. 
In this context, it is essential to devise measur-
ers to expand the stock market's fund-raising 
capacity in order to facilitate the sale of state-
owned shares.
Shift of Household Asset Allocation from Savings 
to Stock Investment
From the macroeconomic point of view, 
there are conditions in place to make it pos-
sible for the stock market to expand its fund-
raising capacity. First and foremost, there are 
household savings that go well over 7 trillion 
RMB (Figure 4). While the annual increase 
in household savings narrowed steadily until 
2000 after peaking out in 1996, the balance 
of savings kept growing by nearly 500 billion 
RMB or more each year. According to the 
1999 estimate by the People's Bank of Chi-
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na, of the total fi nancial assets held by Chi-
nese households amounting to 8,167.4 billion 
RMB, deposit assets accounted for 5,962.2 bil-
lion RMB, or a little over 70% (Table 3). On 
the other hand, the share of stock certifi cates 
and other stock-related assets was merely 6%. 
Since around 2000, general interest in 
stock investment has been on the rise as stock 
prices have come out of the long period of 
stagnation. A survey on urban households' at-
titudes on savings conducted by the People's 
Bank of China in the fi rst quarter of 2001, the 
ratio of households that regard equity shares 
as a major element of fi nancial assets rose 
to 12.0% from 6.8% in the fourth quarter 
of 1999, almost doubling in just over a year. 
The number of stock investment accounts in-
creased by 8.5 million in 2001 alone to total 
66.5 million.
Given the currently low ratio of stock as-
sets to total household fi nancial assets, it is 
quite likely that households will increase stock 
holdings going forward. The key to increased 
stock investment by households is how to low-
er risks associated with stock investment.10 The 
Chinese stock market remains highly spec-
ulative. The turnover ratio (turnover/year-
end balance of negotiable shares) is around 
500%, 10 to 15 times as high as the matured 
stock markets in Europe, the United States 
and Japan. The average holding period for 
a given stock is less than two months. Invest-
ment risk is evidently very high for ordinary 
investors. Based on one sampling survey, over 
80% of small and medium investors incurred 
investment losses despite the sharp rises in 
the stock price index in recent years (though 
over 70% of them were profi table in 2000). 
Unless this high-risk market environment is 
rectifi ed, households cannot be expected to 
make a further shift from savings to stock in-
vestment in the allocation of fi nancial assets.
Fundamentally, the speculative nature 
of the Chinese stock market stems in part 
from instability of management at listed en-
terprises. Many of Chinese enterprises seem 
unable to stably maintain the good business 
performance seen at the time of their listings. 
Accounts rigging still remains the serious 
problem, making it considerably diffi cult to 
reasonably forecast earnings performances of 
listed enterprises. Against these backgrounds, 
investors tend to focus on short-term margin 
earnings rather than on long-term investment 
gains. Investors' orientation toward short-
term gains helps increase market volatility, 
and consequently further reinforces the spec-
ulative aspect of the stock market.
In order to help increase the stock mar-
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Figure 4  Growth of Household Savings
                (1991-2001)
Table 3  Composition of Household Financial
              Assets (as of 1999 year end)
Source: http://www.dtjww.gov.cn/dtjw/guoneiwaixw/002.htm.
Original data is based on an estimation made by the People’s
Bank of China based on household survey. 
Note: Since the original figure in the item of “Bonds” was
obviously incorrect (89,840), it is deducted by subtracting other
assets from the total.
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ket's stability, it is necessary to foster inves-
tors who are capable of effectively monitoring 
management of listed enterprises. From this 
standpoint, the regulatory authorities have 
been making strong efforts in recent years to 
foster institutional investors.
5.2.2 Micro Aspects: Institutional In-
vestors as Agents of Corporate 
Governance 
China's stock market has so far been 
dominated by small individual investors. Gen-
erally speaking, however, these individual in-
vestors are incapable of effective monitoring 
of management of listed enterprises. In or-
der to strengthen the corporate governance 
function of the stock market and reduce stock 
investment risks, it is important to shift the 
weight from small investments by individual 
investors to institutional investors with moni-
toring capabilities.
Growth of Institutional Investors 
The presence of institutional investors 
on the Chinese stock market seems to be ex-
panding rapidly following the government's 
policy from 1999 to encourage the entry of in-
stitutional investors. According to an estimate 
made by an offi cial of the People's Bank of 
China in 2001, stock holdings by institution-
al investors have already accounted for 30% 
to 40% of the total value of negotiable shares. 
Of this, about 85% were held by privately sub-
scribed investment funds catering to corpo-
rate clients, and around 15% by publicly of-
fered investment funds.11
For the moment, however, the rapid 
growth of institutional investors has not nec-
essarily contributed to greater stability of the 
stock market yet. Rather, some institutional in-
vestors, taking advantage of the relative mag-
nitude of investment funds available to them, 
even seem to be manipulating stock prices to 
their advantage. In October 2000, a securities 
exchange offi cial dropped a bombshell by re-
vealing the prevalence of illicit price manipu-
lation by securities investment funds.12
There exists a sort of dilemma between 
the growth of institutional investors and stabi-
lization of the stock market. As long as inves-
tors participating in the stock market prefer 
high returns by taking high risks, institutional 
investors entrusted by them cannot help but 
make speculative investment. 
Pension and Insurance Funds
Greater expectations may be placed on 
pension funds and insurance funds, rather 
than on ordinary investment funds, as insti-
tutional investors who help stabilize the stock 
market. By nature, these funds can be expect-
ed to emphasize investment aimed to realize 
long-term and stable gains. In addition to the 
public pension system now being developed 
in China, private pensions such as supple-
mentary pension schemes by enterprises and 
savings-type pension plans for individuals are 
growing. The regulatory authorities have also 
taken measures to encourage stock market 
investment by pension and insurance funds, 
such as the permission for these funds to di-
rectly invest in the stock market and the hike 
in the ratio of stock investment to their total 
assets.13
Conclusion : Prospects for Privatiza-
tion of Large Enterprises
Since the latter half of the 1990s, the 
administrative authorities have been promot-
ing the exchange listings of large state-owned 
enterprises, and in 2001 launched a full-
fl edged policy to facilitate the sale of state-
owned shares on the market. These measures 
have potential to lead to de facto privatization 
of large state-owned enterprises in the long 
run, and in that sense, can be considered as 
ground-breaking developments in China's 
economic system reforms.
However, as discussed in this chapter, 
these policy initiatives have hit the wall of very 
down-to-earth constraints in the Chinese mar-
ket stemming from the fact that both the in-
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stitutional framework of the stock market and 
effective market players have yet to be fully 
developed. Steady development of the institu-
tional framework of the stock market is indis-
pensable in order to further facilitate privati-
zation of large enterprises through the stock 
market. Needless to say, this cannot be done 
overnight. It will be a considerable time be-
fore institutional investors grow up to per-
form the role of effective monitors of corpo-
rate governance on the stock market. All in 
all, privatization of large enterprises in China 
is expected to prove a long and gradual pro-
cess.
(Ken-ichi IMAI) 
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